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Nature of the case
The portion of this case under appeal are motions that were denied in the Magistrate
Court, appealed and denied in the District Court, and now appealed to the Supreme Court; those
motions being 1) Change of and/or new orders pursuant to IRCP 60, 2) change of venue, 3)
Holding Defendant in contempt, and 4) Disqualification of Magistrate Judge Gary DeMeyer with
cause. The Appellant has made numerous collateral attacks on a judgment asserted to have been
made under color of law, without jurisdiction, while ignoring fundamental civil rights, and
tantamount to a termination of parental rights without any cause whatsoever, while being assisted
by other magistrate and district courts in the Third Judicial District and numerous officers of
those courts before and after the trial in CV-2014-7409 in Canyon County that was consolidated
with CV-2014-3311 in Adams County. Evidence to numerous wrongful and/or erroneous acts,
fully demonstrable on court records, have been presented in said collateral attackt, but were
dismissed without consideration or hearing.

Course of the Proceedings

CV - 2012 - 6404 in Canyon County, CPO filed on July 02, 2012, and dismissed on the
Hearing date July 12, 2012 by petitioner, Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook)
CV - 2014 - 6865 in Canyon County, filed on July 1, 2014 by petitioner Ronald Van
Hook, with temp CPO granted. Respondent could not be located to be served, Petitioner filed for
Legal Separation and custody at the same time in CV-2014-7409. Court ordered this to go to
publication. On Aug. 18, 2014, service by publication for CV-2014-7409 was complete and
effective, but there was not effective service on CV-2014-6865.
CV - 2014 - 8801 in Canyon County-Aug. 25, 2014, CPO by petitioner Ronald Van
Hook, Dismissed by Court presided over by Gary DeMeyer.
CV - 2014 - 7049 in Canyon County, Legal Separation and child custody awarded to
plaintiff Ronald Van Hook, after Service was completed 8-18-14, Motion for Default on 9-8-14
and Default hearing on 9-11-14.
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CV-2014-9041 in Canyon County, CPO filed by Ronald Van Hook and dismissed by
Court.
CV - 2014- 3311 in Adams County, CPO filed by Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on 904-14. On 09-18-14 hearing set out to 10-02-14 so petitioner could get an attorney. Hearing
held on 10-02-14 and continued after court ordered hair follicle drug test and CPS investigation.
Hearing on 10-27-14 with CPO granted to petitioner until June 14, 2016, but CPO did not extend
to the children, and full custody of children awarded to petitioner, overturning decision in
Canyon County CV-2104-7409.
CV - 2014 - 11708 in Canyon County, CPO filed by Ronald Van Hook on 11-14-2014
and Dismissed by Court presided over by Gary DeMeyer.
CV - 2014- 6865 in Canyon County, Motion to Reinstate Protection Order, alternatively
Motion for Protection Order, filed by Ronald Van Hook through his Attorney Steven Fisher, on
11-14-2014, but not set to hearing.
CV - 2014- 7049 in Canyon County, Defendants Motion to set aside Legal Separation on
10-15-14, and Motion in Limine (from CPS investigation in Adams County CV-2014-3311) on
10-24-14. Ex Parte Restraining order issued on 3-25-14. Temp. Orders were issued and Steven
Fisher was given leave from the case on 4-16-14, and Case became consolidated with Adams
County case CV-2014-3311. Multiple Motions filed by Plaintiff prose, including objection to
restraining order, objection to temp orders, motion to disqualify judge with cause, motion for
Guardian Ad Litem (with court requiring the posting of a $20,000 bond), and request for order
for polygraph examination of both parties; all of plaintiffs motions denied and/or dismissed by
the court. Case went to trial and Decree of Divorce entered on 9-9-15 giving sole legal custody
of the minor children to the defendant.
CV-2015-0678, presided over by judge D. Grober in Owyhee County- Petition for
Temporary Restraining Order with Affidavit and Motion for fee waiver was filed on 9-11-2015.
Fee waiver was granted and Motion for restraining order was denied without hearing on 9-11-15.
CV - 2014- 7049 in Canyon County, Defendant retained Virginia Bond as attorney on 912-15 who made Court appearance on 9-23-15 when motions for New Trail and Reconsideration
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were filed. On 11-17-15, motions were set to hearing for 1-14-16. Motions were withdrawn on
12-22-15 and new motion was filed for a change of venue on 12-30-16. On 1-28-16, Motion for
change of venue was denied. On 3-8-16, attorney Virginia Bond filed to talce leave from the
case, which was granted on 3-17-16. Ronald Van Hook prose, filed motion to Disqualify Judge
DeMeyer with cause on 4-1-16, and the motion was denied on 4-21-16.
CV - 2016 - 5044 in Canyon County was a petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Habeas
Corpus, filed on 5-27-16 and presided over by Judge Vandervelde, with the Motions becoming
Bifurcated, Mandamus dismissed and Habeas Corpus changing venue to Adams County on 1216-16.
CV-2014-7409 Notice of Appeal to the District Court was filed on 6-1-16, Appealing the
Magistrate Courts Decision to Dismiss the Motion to Disqualify Judge DeMeyer with cause.
The appeal was presided over by Judge D. McKee, was briefed by both parties, heard and
ultimately denied on 10-14-16. The case was handed back to Judge DeMeyer.
CV-2014-7409 on 10-20-16, Plaintiffs Motion for Change of and/or New Orders was
· filed pursuant to IRCP 60. Criminal Contempt charges were brought against Defendant Cannon
and a Motion for Change of Venue. A Hearing was held on 11-3-16 with Judge Howard Smyser
presiding. Defendant Cannon failed to appear at the arraignment for Contempt, and the Court
accepted a not guilty plea from Kimberli Stretch, Attorney for Defendant. All other Motions
were not heard and reset to be heard by Judge DeMeyer. On 11-3-16, there was an Order setting
case and Scheduling Order for the Contempt Charges against Defendant signed by Judge
DeMeyer. On 11-7-16, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and Motion to Disqualify
Judge DeMeyer with cause. Defendant filed motions to dismiss. On 12-8-16, All Motions were
dismissed by the Court, presided over by Gary DeMeyer, who granted attorney fees to Kimberli
Stretch. On 12-15-16, Plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal to the District Court.
On 1-27-17, Kimberli Stretch filed a Motion for Referral to Administrative Judge for
Vexatious Litigation, which was heard on 2-14-17 by Judge Ford, who stated at the conclusion
of the Hearing that a decision would be made within 30 days.
Appellants Brief was filed on 1-30-2017. Respondents Brief was filed on 1-30-2017
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(Respondents Brief remains missing from the record sent to the Supreme Court after the Court
Record was objected to on 7-10-17) Appellants Response filed 3-3-17 and Memorandum
Decision on Appeal was filed 3-20-17. The Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court was then
filed on4-3-17.

Continued action was taken on Case CV-2014-7409 after the Notice of Appeal was filed
with the Supreme Court as follows ...
CV - 2017 - 3664 in Adams County was a Habeas Corpus action (from the changed
venue from Canyon County in CV-2016-5044) presided over by Judge C. Nye, set to hearing on
June 23,2016, but dismissed on June 21, 2016 and hearing vacated.
CV - 2016 - 11807 in Canyon County was a civil Complaint for Damages, filed on 12-116 by Ronald Van Hook Plaintiff against Defendants Gary DeMeyer, Mary Grant and Kimberli
Stretch of Idaho Legal Aid, Steven Fisher, Virginia Bond and Dawn Cannon (fka) Van Hook.
Multiple motions to dismiss were filed, and all Defendants motions were granted with the
exception of Dawn Cannon that remains a defendant in this case, after her motion for
reconsideration on 4-27-17 was denied on 7-19-17.
Vexatious Litigation Proceedings continue in Canyon County in CV - 2017 - 3444 which
case number was changed from CV-2014-7409 after Judge DeMeyer signed an order referring
the Vex. Lit. case after the Notice of Appeal was filed with the Supreme Court.

Statement of Facts

I. Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County
(CV-2012-6404) against Ronald Van Hook on 07-02-2012 and was granted a temporary
CPO, which was dismissed by the petitioner on 07-12-2012.
2. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV 2014-
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6865) against Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on 07-01-2014 on behalf of the parties
minor children, and was granted a temporary CPO.
3. Ronald Van Hook filed 'Complaint for Custody, Visitation and Support' on 07-15-2014
(CV-2014-7409), and then on 07-18-2014 filed 'Amended Complaint for a Decree of
Legal Separation and for Custody of the Parties' Minor Children', which ran concurrently
with the CPO (CV-2014-6865). The CPO case was never heard as Respondent could not
be located, having fled with the children to places unknown, and was dismissed for lack
of service by the court on 08-18-2014 after several continuances, but the Court stated the
CPO could be refiled and republished. The case in CV-2014-7409 was properly served
by publication by order of the Court and went into default.
4. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV-20148801) against Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on 08-25-2014 on behalf of the parties
minor children, and the written petition was incomplete, and then petitioner stated to the
court that the clerks office would not allow an attachment but that petitioner was to give
it to the court once called, and petitioner also informed the court of an impairment that
inhibited writing by hand, and asked if the court was going to review the allegations, to
which the court answered no, and the petition was dismissed.
5. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV-20149041) against Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook) on behalf of the parties minor children, and
the Court stated it would send a letter to the Department of Health and Welfare, but
denied the petition. When the Court was asked by petitioner why a CPO had been
granted earlier but not now, the Court answered that he wasn't the other judge.
5

6. Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Adams County
(CV-2014-3311) against Ronald Van Hook on 09-04-2014, citing the same issues in her
petition that had been previously dismissed in Canyon County case CV-2012-6404, and
was granted a temporary CPO. On the hearing date of09-18-2014, Ms. Cannon never
disclosed her address or a place where effective service could be made, and was without
legal counsel. The Hearing date was reset for 10-02-2014, allowing the petitioner time to
retain legal counsel.
7. On 09-08-2014 case number CV-2014-7409 went into default, and at a default hearing on
09-11-2014 petitioner was awarded sole legal custody of the parties' minor children.
8. At a hearing for Adams County CV-2014-3311 on 10-02-2014, Petitioner, during direct
examination, was asked what she was afraid of when she left Canyon County with the
children, and she answered "Nothing".
9. In Adams County CV-2014-3311 on 10-02-2014 the court ordered a CPS investigation,
which was conducted by Ms. Krista Easteppe, which resulted in a report with
recommendations that were submitted to the court. Ms. Easteppe, who by her own
testified admission during examination on 10-27-2014, never contacted any of
Respondents witnesses or considered any affidavits provided by Respondents witnesses
during the investigation.
10. In Adams County CV-2014-3311 it was testified to by multiple witnesses that there was
"Law Enforcement" involvement who had direct contact with Ms. Cannon (fka Van
Hook) during the time frame that the Canyon County CPO (CV-2014-6865) was
effective and awaiting service, yet that CPO was never served.
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11. In Adams County CV- 2014-3311, on 10-02-2014, presided over by Judge John
Meienhoffer, the Court stated before issuing a temporary order,
"I do not want the children around Lloyd and Karen Elderedge at this point. I
have far too many concerns with that. He was placed on 5 years probation in the
State of Oregon for inappropriate contact with a 15 year old girl. Renee is
currently 14 years old. And there's allegations that Karen Elderedge was drinking
daily while down at the trailer court, where Ms. Johnson said Karen Elderedge
always had a beer in her hand. So there's to be no further contact with Karen and
Lloyd Elderedge. That's going to be part of the Courts Order in allowing Mrs.
Van Hook to continue to maintain the primary custody of the children pending
our court date on the 27th."
12. On 10-27-2014 a CPO was granted to Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) in Adams County
CV-2014-3311, presided over by Judge John Meienhoffer, in opposition to and/or
inconsistent with the order previously issued in Canyon County in CV-2014-7409.
13. On 10-27-2014 in Adams County CV-2014-3311, During the Decision, The court
specifically stated the CPO did not apply to the children as there was no evidence of any
physical violence against them by Ronald Van Hook. The Court further stated in its
order
"The issues with regard to the Eldredges, and the allegations of sexual
misconduct. And frankly counsel, those were addressed by my very direct and
specific order, which is going to continue, that the three Van Hook children are to
not have any contact with Mr. and Mrs. Eldredge. Mrs. Van Hook, you can have
whatever contact you want with Mr. Eldredge and Mrs. Eldredge. Those kids are
not to have any contact."
14. On 10-27-2014 in Adams County CV-2014-3311, During the Decision, the Court stated
"Now, this type of litigation Counsel -- Mr. Van Hook, Mrs. Van Hook -- This is
not something that this Court should of had to deal with. This should have been
litigated down in Caldwell in front of the Court that is going to be dealing with
the divorce, the custody of the children, the separation and division of property,
the ordering of evaluations, the ordering of an expert, potentially the order and
potentially a brief focused assessment."
15. On 10-27-2014 in Adams County CV-2014-3311, During the Decision, the Court stated
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"Mr. Van Hook, I'm concerned about how it is that you're just randomly running
into Mr. Eldredge. I'm also concerned about the fact that once you got the Child
Protective Investigation Report you immediately contacted Mrs. Arp and
challenged her. You went up to Mr. Manleys home and you, you addressed him
directly. And while I do understand sir, I understand sir [with emphasis] that you
went two and a half months without seeing your children, and that's of concern.
But I share Miss Easteppes concerns, about the way that you're handling this. I
have no direct experience with this Mr. Van Hook and I, you know I don't know
how a person in your situation should behave. You're upset; That's legitimate.
You didn't see your kids for two and a half months; That's legitimate. You're
angry; Also legitimate. I just, I don't know Mr. Van Hook, if you went too far.
Ms. Easteppe thinks you did. I can tell you sir that there has been some concern
about your roughness and your aggressiveness. I am going to just leave it at that
with regard to the analysis of that portion."
16. In Adams County, Ronald Van Hook, on his own, petitioned for a Civil Protection Order
on behalf of the minor children, and the Court refused to hear it.
17. Ronald Van Hook petitioned for a Civil Protection Order in Canyon County (CV-201411708) on 11-14-2014 against Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook) on behalf of the parties
minor children. At the hearing the Court refused to include the children in a CPO, but
offered a CPO between Mr. and Mrs. Van Hook, even though the petition specifically
stated "Mother has threatened and attempted to kill sons, herself and me. Strikes
Children. Contributes to delinquency (gives alcohol). Endangers children with exposure
to the elements. Neglects children with unsanitary conditions", among other things. The
Court dismissed the petition for CPO.
18. On 10-24-2014 in Canyon County CV-2014-7409, Defendant filed 'Motion in Limine:
Requesting Judicial Notice of Report of Child Protective Investigation. Steven Fisher,
attorney for Plaintiff, failed to submit an objection. The Motion in Limine was granted
on 10-29-2014.
19. On 11-13-2014, Defendants Motion to Set aside Default in CV-2014-7409 was heard.
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Steven Fisher, attorney for Plaintiff, failed to submit a timely objection. The Court, in its
decision, stated "the Court is going to find that Plaintiff had knowledge of where the
Defendant was at the time he applied for the default." The Order setting aside the default
was issued 11-19-2014.
20. On 03-23-2015, Defendant filed for an Ex-Parte Restraining order, which was granted on
03-25-2015. On 04-03-2015, Appellant filed on his own, an Objection to the Ex-Parte
Restraining Order.
21. Ms. Mary Grant of Idaho Legal Aid, counsel for defendant in case CV-2014-7409, had
filed a motion for temporary orders, which were to be effective between the dates of the
expiration of the CPO in Adams County (CV-2014-3311) and the Trial in Canyon
County (CV-2014-7409). Mr. Fisher, counsel for plaintiff, failed to submit any response
to the Defendants Motions. At the hearing, on 04-04-2016, The court directly asked
Defendants Counsel if the Temporary Orders were consistent with the Protection Order,
and Ms. Grant answered Yes, while Mr. Fisher failed to offer any objection. Mr. Van
Hook, who stood to object, was threatened with incarceration by the court. Temporary
Orders, that were inconsistent with previous orders, were allowed by the court without
any review of the previous orders, and Mr. Fisher was allowed leave from the case while
the Plaintiff was not allowed to make any objections. Prior to this Hearing, Appellant.
On his own, filed in Adams County for Contempt charges against Defendant. That
hearing was presided over by Judge Meienhoffer, who dismissed the case stating it could
be refiled in Canyon County, and changed the venue to Canyon County while considering
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the pending case consolidation.
22. On 05-18-2015, Defendant filed a Renewed Motion to Consolidate Cases, which
consolidated Adams County CV-2014-3311 with Canyon County CV-2014-7409. On
05-26-2015 the court ordered these cases consolidated.
23. Ronald Van Hook, Plaintiff Pro Se, on 05-28-2015, filed Motions to Amend
Consolidation of Cases, to Amend Temporary Orders for Custody and Visitation,
Disqualification, and an Objection to the Ex-Parte Restraining Order. These were heard
on 05-07-2015 and the Court instructed the Plaintiff to refile. The Motions were refiled
with a notice of appearance pro-se by plaintiff, and then heard on 06-11-2015 in the
Court presided over by Judge Gary DeMeyer. All motions were denied.
24. On 07-07-2015, Plaintiff Pro Se filed a Motion for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem.
This matter was heard on 07-16-2015 and the Court required a $20,000 bond be posted
by Plaintiff. Plaintiff informed the Court he could not post the bond and the Motion was
then denied.
25. On 08-03-2015, during the trial, Judge Gary DeMeyer, presiding, refused to allow any of
consolidated case to be considered in the trial. The oral exchange between the Plaintiff
and the Court as follows:
COURT: I don't care what happened in the Protection Order. This is my case.
I'm trying it, and I'm hearing it. So, I'm sustaining the objection.
Mr. Van Hook: Is there still the testimony that was offered still in this case
though? The previous testimonies that were given.
COURT: It's an all brand new ball game at this point in time.
Mr. Van Hook: I'm failing to understand then why we cannot allow the testimony
of people if it was already offered at the CPU.
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COURT: I'm not considering it.
26. On 08-03-2015, during the trial, Judge Gary DeMeyer, presiding, refused to allow
Ms.Tiffany Warren to testify, per the oral exchange in the Court as follows:
COURT: I think you'd have to call Tiffany Warren. I don't think I can---- as
such without her being here.
Mr. Van Hook: She is here in the hall way sir.
COURT: Well, do you want to call her then?
MS. Stretch: Well we object, she's not on the list.
COURT: Oh she's not on the list?
Ms. Stretch: She's not on the July 6th witness list. She's on the July 30th one but
not the July 6th one. So she's on the one you already dismissed.
Mr. Van Hook: Again, these are text messages I just became aware of about a
week ago.
COURT: All right I'm going to sustain the objection.
27. On 08-07-2015, in the Courts Decision, Counsel for the Defendant, Kimberly Stretch of
Idaho Legal Aid, was instructed by the Court to write the order and submit it directly to
the Court without any review or approval from the Plaintiff. This Order that was
submitted was inconsistent with the order the Court gave, but was signed by the court
anyway, and the written order is tantamount to a termination of parental rights.
28. All issues that were decided by the Court in CV-2014-7409 at the Default Hearing on 0911-2014 to be true and correct are issues that were later testified to in Adams County CV2014-3311 (CPO) and Canyon County CV-2014-7409 (trial), and the Defendant offered
no refuting evidence or testimony nor provided any witnesses to refute those same issues,
and the Decision of the trial court omitted each of those issues from its decision, and
those issues are quoted from the Plaintiff in the Default Hearing as follows:
"My wife's threatened to kill my kids. She doesn't take care of them. They live
in squalor. She does not tend to my kids. She lets other people smack my kids
around. She smacks my kids around. She's gotten my daughter drunk on several
11

occasions. My daughter is 13 years old. She ran off with a convicted sex
offender from the State of Oregon. That's been expunged but from a Private
Investigators Report, He's a sexual criminal, that's who she's in the presence of."
29. On Sept. 11, 2015, an Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order was filed in the
District Court of Owyhee County, presided over by Judge Grober, by the Plaintiff Ronald
Van Hook against Defendants Dawn Cannon (fka Van Hook), Lloyd Elderedge and
Karen Elderedge, Supported by the affidavit of plaintiff, together with a Motion for Fee
Waiver supported by an Affidavit pertaining to Fee Waiver. On Sept. 11, 2015, the
Plaintiffs Motion for fee waiver was approved. On Sept. 11, 2015, the Plaintiffs Motion
for Ex Parte restraining Order was denied without a hearing.
30. Plaintiff/Appellant retained the services of Attorney Virginia Bond on 09-12-2015. Ms.
Bond filed a Notice of Appearance in Canyon County Case CV-2014-7409 on 09-232015, and on the same day filed Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration.
On 11-17-2015, Ms. Bond filed a Notice of Hearing for a hearing on 01-14-2016. Before
the Hearing for the Motions for New Trial and Reconsideration, Ms. Bond filed Motion
to withdraw Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration on 12-22-2015
without an affidavit from the Plaintiff/Appellant. On 12-24-2016, the Court entered an
Order to Withdraw Motion for New Trial and Motion for Reconsideration and Vacate
Hearing. Ms. Bond then filed a Motion to Change Venue, with an affidavit from
Plaintiff/Appellant on 12-30-2015. A Notice of Hearing was filed on 01-14-2016 for
hearing on 01-28-2016, and at that Hearing, presided over by Judge Gary DeMeyer, the
Court Dismissed the Motion to Change Venue. Ms. Bond next filed a Motion to
withdraw as attorney of record and Notice of Hearing on 03-08-2016 for a hearing date of
12

03-17-2016, Presided over by Judge William B. Dillon, who granted Ms. Bonds Motion,
and the Court Notes do not reflect that Plaintiff/Appellant filed an affidavit in
conjunction with his Objection to Ms. Bonds Motion to withdraw as attorney of record,
while Ms. Kimberly Stretch, attorney for Defendant/Respondent, when asked by the
Court if she wanted to review the Affidavit of Plaintiff/Appellant, stated she didn't care
what was in the affidavit, she had no objection to Ms. Bond withdrawing as attorney for
plaintiff/appellant.

Introductory Arguments:
Pro Se litigants Court submissions are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent
standards than submissions of lawyers. If the Court can reasonably read the submissions, it
should do so, despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor
syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with rule requirements. (Boag v.
MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 102 S.Ct. 700, 70 L.Ed.2d 551 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78
S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d ,80 (1957)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30, L.Ed.2d 652
(1972); McDowell v. Delaware State Police, 88 F.3d 188, 189 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v.
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3rd Cir. 1992)(holding prose petition cannot be held to same standard as
pleadings drafted by attorneys); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F.Supp.2d 422,429 (D.N.J. 1999).
The Idaho State Constitution Article 1, Section 3, cites the US Constitution as being the
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND. U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2 (The Supremacy
Clause) provides that the U.S. Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it and treaties made
under its authority, constitute the supreme law of the land. It provides that State Courts are
bound by the supreme law; in case of conflict between federal and state law, the federal law must
be applied. Even State Constitutions are subordinate to Federal Law.
This case, and cases pertaining to this case, have been going on since 2012. The
statement of facts provided are merely a starting point, or highlights of the facts, and certainly do
not in any way reflect all of the facts in this case and other cases pertaining to this case. It is
13

important that all cases pertaining to this case be viewed and/or considered, as they are of the
same subject matter, or they have a direct link to the subject matter at hand. The cases with
linking or same subject matter contain, as asserted by appellant, demonstrations of how the
Respondent, certain State Actors, and certain Non-State Actors have abused and/or used the
Courts as 'stepping stones' to arrive at unlawful conclusions, decisions and orders.
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court,
he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763
F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the court is fraud
which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is not fraud between the
parties or fraudulent documents, false statements or perjury ... it is where the court
or a member is corrupted or influenced or influence is attempted or where the
judge has not performed his judicial function - thus where the impartial functions
of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud upon the court" has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to
"embrace that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself,
or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can
not perform in the usual mannerist impartial task of adjudging cases that are
presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's
Federal Practice, 2d ed., p.512. A 'I[ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a
decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and
never becomes final."
The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that "justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice", Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct.
1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13,
1954).
Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court requesting Judicial Notice be taken of certain
cases "Directly Associated With and/or of the same, similar, or associated subject matter as the
case currently pending on appeal" on July 12, 2017, and that Request was denied Aug. 7, 2017.
Appellant, after reviewing the Court Record provided by Canyon County, prior to it
being sent up to the Supreme Court, objected to the contents of that record as being incomplete.
This objection was filed with the District Court on 07-10-2017 and went without objection or
response from the Respondent. That being the case, the District Court Augmented the cases it
had jurisdiction to Augment on 07-18-2017. From the Appellants list of cases to Augment, 3 of
them are not from Canyon County. CV-2014-3311 was from Adams County, but was already
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consolidated with CV-2014-7409 in Canyon County. The other cases not from Canyon County
are CV-2014-0678 in Owyhee County, and CV-2017-3444 from Adams County, both of which
were collateral attacks on what Appellant asserts to be illegal orders and illegal proceedings
conducted in Canyon County. All other cases being from Canyon County, the District Courts
Augmentation should apply and should be therefore considered by the Supreme Court.
Kimberly Stretch filed to have Appellant held as a Vexatious Litigant, and there was a
hearing before Judge Ford on February 14, 2017, regarding vexatious litigation, where Kimberly
Stretch, counsel for Respondent, presented to the Court a copy of Appellants Court submissions
she claimed to be vexatious. Appellant responded during this hearing and presented to that Court
documents submitted to a court to Make Ms. Stretchs compilation of documents more complete.
Furthermore, Appellant submitted to that court a 'Flash Drive' with copies of most all court
submissions to various court proceedings and audios of Court Hearings, and both the documents
and the flash drive were admitted and labeled as exhibits accepted by the Court. During this
hearing, Judge Ford stated he would have his decision in 30 days. As. this was all done under
Case CV-2014-7409, every bit of the information provided to that Court are part of this case and
must be considered by the Supreme Court.
CV-2014-7409 continued, even after Appellant filed the Notice of Appeal to the Supreme
Court, when Magistrate Judge Gary DeMeyer signed an order referring the Appellant for
Vexatious Litigant proceedings ... which had already been heard, as previously mentioned, on
Feb. 14, 2014. Judge Ford changed the case number to CV-2017-3444, however, again as
previously stated, all the evidence Kimberly Stretch presented to that Court, had originally been
presented when the case was CV-2014-7409. The sudden change of case numbers, and the
timing of this litigation (while the matter was already pending before the Supreme Court)
certainly has the appearance of an attempt to keep these matters from being viewable by the
Supreme Court in this Appeal. However, the Supreme Court must view and consider this as it
was a part of CV-2014-7409 when these exhibits were submitted, and these exhibits pull in all
cases that Kimberly Stretch submitted documentation for, and that Appellant submitted as
exhibits as well. The cases involved in the vexatious litigation proceedings under CV-201415

7409, cases consolidated and cases augmented include the following: Canyon County CV-20126404, CV-2014-6865, CV-2014-7409, CV-2014-8801, CV-2014-9041, CV-2014-11708, CV2016-5044 and CV-2016-11807. Adams County CV-2014-3311 and CV-2017-3664. Owyhee
County CV-2015-0678. And finally another Canyon County Case, CV-2017-3444, which is the
Vexatious Litigant Proceedings originally filed as CV-2014-7409, and then further pursued
under the order of Gary DeMeyer, even after this appeal to the Supreme Court was noticed.
After the cases were ordered Augmented, Appellant paid all required fees, and then the
record was sent to the Supreme Court without allowing appellant the time necessary to review
the record for completeness. Appellant asserts the record that was sent to the Supreme Court is
incomplete, and Appellant further claims this to be the cause of a Grieved Status and requests
redress in the form of a Writ of Creatorai ordering the presentation of all documents pertaining to
this case be submitted to this Court for review. Justice Demands the Appearance of Justice
(Previously cited in Levine v. United States), and the fact that pertinent documents that are
necessary for justice are missing from the record fails to give this the appearance of Justice.
A few examples of missing documents are as follows:
CV-2014-3311 from Adams County, and all associated documents, are completely
missing. This was consolidated with CV-2014-7409 and must be available for this courts review
and/or reference. Prior to the trial in CV-2014-7409, appellant had requested discovery in the
production of Health and Welfare records (cite page number in record) This was ordered be
provided to the Appellant, but never was, and remains missing from the record. The submissions
made to the District Court on appeal, before this appeal to the Supreme Court, are incomplete as
the Transcript for the Hearing before the District Court on the appellants first appeal to the
District Court is missing. This transcript was originally in the record, but the Appellant objected
to the record being incomplete. The record was ordered Augmented with the missing documents
that the District Court had jurisdiction over, and some of those documents were added to the
record in the amended record that was sent to the Supreme Court, but now the aforementioned
Transcript is no longer part of the record. (cite date filed). Another document requested in the
Objection to the Record was from the evidence presented to the Magistrate Court during the trial;
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that being copies of the children's report cards, front and back. (Front side AND Back side ... as
this will clearly demonstrate evidence has been 'Altered' when the document currently in the
record does not match the document that accurately described during the trial). Also missing are
the Objections to the Motions filed by Respondent in 2015 while Steven Fisher was attorney for
the appellant, or the specific notation on the record that these documents do not exist. Also
missing is the "Sealed Envelope" providing Department of Health and Welfare Records per
Subpoena Duces Tecum, response signed by Brent King and filed on July 23, 2015 (Rec. 294295) and then disclosure was ordered July 27, 2015 (Rec. 309-310). Also missing is any
notation by the Court that there is NOT an Affidavit from the Appellant that allowed Virginia
Bond to dismiss the Motions for and Reconsideration and Retrial on Dec. 22, 2015.
Documents, such as the ones listed that are missing, but not necessarily limited to those
listed, are necessary to the Appellant in this appeal, for the Motion under IRCP 60 that this Court
must allow to come to fruition, for demonstrating the need for the Disqualification of Gary
DeMeyer from this case, for demonstrating malfeasance on the part of numerous attorneys in this
case, for future complaints and/or court actions for civil rights violations, etc. These missing
documents and whether or not they are considered in this appeal, are certainly up to the
discretion of this court ... Regardless, their absence from the record gives the appearance of
something amiss, and is cause for a grievance by the Appellant, which is why the appellant
requests a writ of Certiorari.
Preface to issues currently on appeal:
Appellant requests the Court fully review the Order that was written with the Order that
was given by the Court on 08-27-2015. Appellant further requests review of the audio record to
demonstrate the method in which the Order was written. Kimberly Stretch, Counsel for the
Respondent, and by specific order from the Court in CV-2014-7409, wrote the order after the
court relayed its decision, and was further ordered to write this order without any assistance or
approval from the Appellant before submitting it directly to the Court. Judge DeMeyer then
signed the order Ms. Stretch had prepared, (filed with the court on 09-09-2015 and signed by
Judge DeMeyer on 09-11-2015) and that order written is inconsistent with the Order that was
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actually given and is tantamount to the termination of the parental rights of the Appellant. There
are absolutely no parental rights that appellant has the ability to exercise. There is absolutely no
guaranteed right to any communication with my children whatsoever. There is however a
requirement to pay child support, which appellant pays, ultimately under the threat of being held
in contempt and being subjected to penalties associated with contempt if the order is not
followed. Furthermore; the Respondent agreed to certain divisions of property and the
payment/settlement of debts which still have yet to be satisfied.
As detailed in the statement of facts, Appellant next filed for a Restraining Order, in
Appellants County of Residence, Owyhee County, and this was denied by that Court. The
parties listed in the Restraining Order were Dawn Cannon (flea Van Hook), Lloyd Elderedge, and
Karen Elderedge. Judge DeMeyer, in the Trial made it very clear that the Elderedges were not a
party to the action, and further made it clear, contrary to the claims of Counsel for the
Respondent, that he was not going to consider anything from the CPO in Adams County, which
had been consolidated with the case in Canyon County- CV-2014-3311 consolidated with CV2014-7409 in Canyon County. With this in mind, Appellant filed for the restraining order using
only issues that were not allowed, or hadn't been decided in the trial. Furthermore, as detailed in
the Statement of Facts, Lloyd and Karen Elderedge were to be allowed to have no contact
whatsoever with the minor children of the Appellant and the Respondent when there was an
existing order in Adams County. Furthermore, as detailed in the statement of facts, that order
from the court in Adams County was to be consistent with the new temporary orders in Canyon
County. Furthermore, Appellant asserts that both counsel for the Respondent and Counsel for
the Appellant committed a fraud on the Court when Respondents Counsel affirmed that the new
orders were consistent with the previous orders, and Appellants Counsel offered no objections.
Furthermore, Appellant asserts that Judge Gary DeMeyer violated Due Process and failed to
guarantee Equal Protection when he failed to allow Appellant any opportunity to offer any
objections and threatened Appellant with incarceration for standing up to object. Furthermore,
Appellant asserts Judge Gary DeMeyer continued to violate the Appellants right to due process
and equal protection when he failed to change the orders to an appropriate order after Appellant
18

filed a Motion to amend orders after having filed his notice of appearance. (again, this is just the
tip of the iceberg. This in no way reflects every single action by the court and/or officers of the
court, for which Appellant has a grievance)
As detailed in the statement of facts, Appellant retained Ms. Virginia Bond as counsel,
and ultimately Ms. Bond was given leave from the case. Appellant claims a grieved status for
many issues that occurred between the time that Ms. Bond was retained as counsel for the
Appellant and the time Ms. Bond was allowed leave from the case. Appellant is aggrieved that
Ms. Bond never appealed the decision of the trial court through very deceptive means and
excuses. Appellant is aggrieved by the excessive amount of time between the filing of Motions
for a Retrial and for Reconsideration, and the time it took to set hearings on those motions.
Appellant is aggrieved by the Objections to these motions filed by Respondent in that they are
full of untruthful statements to which appellant asserts amounts to perjury, and that those issues
were shown to Ms. Bond and demonstrated as being untruthful on the part of the Respondent by
way of actual audio recordings from the trial and earlier CPO in Adams County. Appellant is
aggrieved that Ms. Bond deceptively dismissed the Appellants Motions without the approval of
the Appellant. Appellant is aggrieved that the Court in CV-2014-7409, presided over by Judge
DeMeyer, Ordered the Motions Dismissed in the absence of an Affidavit by the Appellant.
Appellant is aggrieved that the venue of the case was not changed as required by (insert ref.).
Appellant is aggrieved that Ms. Bond was allowed leave from the case while Ms. Stretch directly
told the Court she didn't care what was in the Appellants affidavit. (ref transcript) Appellant is
aggrieved that the Court Notes from Ms. Bonds motion to take leave from the case, do not reflect
Appellant filed an affidavit, and Appellant further asserts that the affidavit filed by the appellant
in objection to Ms. Bond being allowed to take leave from the case, clearly shows malfeasance
on the part of Ms. Virginia Bond. (ref. all motions) (Ref. Objections to motions) (ref.
affidavit.)(ref. Transcript)
Appellant, after having long since lost all faith and Confidence in the ability of Judge
Gary DeMeyer to guarantee fundamentally fair proceedings, Appellant field a Motion to Recuse
Judge Gary DeMeyer with Cause for Bias. As the record will show, this motion was denied after
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counsel for respondent argued 'there was nothing pending to recuse the judge from' and declared
frivolous.
Appellant appealed the Magistrate Courts Decision to the District Court, and that appeal
was presided over by District Court Judge Duff McKee (hereinafter, "!st appeal")
The I st appeal was noticed, briefed and went to hearing. The Court made it very clear
that there was nothing pending before the magistrate court to actually recuse Judge DeMeyer for.
COURT: There's no basis for the appeal because there is no matter pending upon
which the judge is being called upon to act and from which he can be recused
from acting. (T. Pg47 L15-18)
Appellant argued the term "at any time" is self-evident, regarding when a judge can be
disqualified with cause, but the court disagreed. Appellant asserts there was also something
pending at the time the Motion for Change of Venue was heard and dismissed, where a change of
venue was required, per IRFLP 105 A, 502A and IRCP 40.1 (2), as the Court specifically said:
COURT: You haven't reached an agreement, but you're attempting to reach
some sort of
Ms. Bond: Right.
Ms. Stretch: We're attempting to reach an agreement, yes.
COURT: Okay. So I'll just simply put this on hold until I hear back from either
one or both of you that we're proceeding forward with this case. (Transcript form
Motion Hearing on Jan. 28, 2016, P4, LI0-19)
Regardless of the outcome of that 1st appeal, appellant believed it to be in his best
interest (considering the time it takes for appeals to come to fruition before the Supreme Court)
to follow the Courts Advise, that was given directly to the Appellant by presiding Judge Duff
McKee.
COURT: "You take a deep breath, and you step back, and you file the
appropriate motion. And if it's a material mistake, if it's something that is
material to the cause, it can be corrected." (T pg 11 L18-21)
Appellant continued in arguments that were never denied by Respondent or ruled upon
by the Court as follows:
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Mr. Van Hook: "My parental rights have been terminated. And I know
somebody may tum around and say that, Oh, no, you've got this in the order.
What has happened is tantamount to a termination of parental rights. And by
whatever title, by whatever name anybody wants to get it, I have no rights as a
parent. And there is not one shred of evidence against me in the trial. It is all
against my ex-wife. But the judge -Judge DeMeyer just completely flipped the
whole thing around, and that is why I got a new attorney. And I did get the new
attorney who did promise me the moon. And then it came right down to it,
committed forgery, got rid of the case, and now there's not a single thing I can do.
The only step I can take is to have the judge recused with cause." (T pg 12 LS-20)
The Court was specifically asked about the limits of what the court had the ability to do,
and Appellant asserts the courts answer was vague, as it failed to answer the question.
Van Hook: "Am I to understand, Judge, that the only authority this court has is to
either accept Judge DeMeyer's ruling or overrule it? Is that the only thing this
courts going to be able to do?
The Court: "Well, the only thing pending in front of me is Judge DeMeyer's
Motion to Recuse or your Motion to Recuse Judge DeMeyer. But it comes at a
time when there is nothing pending before Judge DeMeyer. The case is all over.
Time is all expired. All the appeal time for the judgment is expired. The time for
the Rule 60(b) Motion to Reconsider for Clerical Errors in the Judgment or
Motion for Clarification under Rule 60(b) has expired. There are still some rights
under 60, but they're down on - 60(c), (d), and (e) and whatnot - I don't want to
get in there." (T pg14 LS-19)
Per IRCP Rule 60 (d), Rule 60 does not limit a courts power to set aside a judgment for
fraud on the Court. This rule is not limited to just the Magistrate Court, but also an authority
held by the District Court. Rule 60 (a) specifically allows the Magistrate to correct errors on
their own, by leave from the Appellate Court if an appeal is pending. Neither Gary DeMeyer of
the Magistrate Court nor Judge McKee of the District Court made any corrections, and appellant
asserts that in this failure to correct known 'Discrepancies' throughout this case, that Discretion
was abused. More specifically, that Frauds on the Court were allowed to go unchecked.
Judge McKee could have at least 'Investigated' allegations against officers of the
Magistrate Court, as the District Court as that authority, whether or not it's brought by motion
or not. Judge McKee demonstrated things were, at the very least, 'Amiss'.
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COURT: "This would defy any graduate lawyer. You could probably write four
of five bar review questions on what you folks have been through just all by
yourself." (T Pg38 Ll4-17)
Judge Meienhofer in Adams County was defiantly involved in all of this as the Court he
presided over in Adams County CV-2014-3311 became consolidated with this case. Appellant
asserts the Court in 3311 acted without jurisdiction over the Appellant, the children or the subject
matter, as custody issues had already been ordered in CV-2014-7409, granting sole custody of
the Children to the Appellant by default. Appellant asserts Judge McKee demonstrated a bias
and abused discretion.
COURT: "Meienhofer went in great lengths of this. I know John well. He's a
good, good, young friend of mine. He started his practice in law with me. He
started as my law clerk 15, 20 years ago. And he's going to be a fine judge. I'm
following him along." (T Pg38 L20-25)
COURT: "When John was in private practice, I used him personally when my
grandson got his tail tied in a knot, and I took him down to see John to get it take care of it. Very practical. Very straight shooter. And I think very, very fair,
a very fair person. Does the absolute best he can." (T Pg39 Ll-6)
The Court specifically addresses whether or not Appellants complaints are frivolous.
Mr. Van Hook: "So you' re telling me, Judge, that even though she has
specifically written an order that the judge never gave that it's frivolous, that my
complaints are frivolous?"
COURT: "The motion to - no, your complaints are not frivolous. That's what
I'm trying to tell you. But you've got them in the wrong forum." (T Pg42 L9-15)
The Court specifically states that this is NOT JUSTICE
COURT: "Well, also I think that what you need to do - this is really tough
advice, but you need to go someplace and take a great big deep breath. Your kids
are going to grow up. The kids are going to grow up. You said earlier, What do I
do? Wait until they're 21? Well, maybe. You wouldn't be the first dad that
didn't get to watch them grow up.
Mr. Van Hook: "And where is the justice in that?"
COURT: "There isn't. There isn't." (T Pg49 L8-16)
The Court further shows that the Order written by Kimberli Stretch, by Order of the
Court in the decision, is inconsistent with the Order the Court actually gave. Appellant asserts
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this to demonstrate further that Kimberli Stretch and Judge DeMeyer, both have committed fraud
on the court.
COURT: Well, that order- that's in the order that it be by phone contact, that the
visitation -

Mr. Van Hook: No, sir. She wrote in the order, "if the kids decide."
COURT: If the kids decide.
Mr. Van Hook: That is not what the judge ordered. He said phone contact was to
remain the same as it is in the previous order.
COURT: It's in there.

Mr. Van Hook: And it gave me unrestricted phone contact between the hours of
8:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m., Monday through Saturday, no restrictions.
COURT: Well, it's not that specific, but phone contact at any time is in the final
judgment.
Mr. Van Hook: No, sir, it's not. She put in there, "if the kids decide"
COURT: Well, they got to answer the phone.
Mr. Van Hook: Sir, phone contact means I pick up the phone; I make the call;
somebody answers the phone. Without that there is no contact. I can call my
kids right now. They're not going to answer the phone. The phone is off the
hook. (T.P44 Ll-23)
Again, Judge McKee demonstrates the Courts knowledge of fundamental flaws in the Order.
Mr. Van Hook: My argument is, Judge, that is not a parental right at that point.
That is a parental decision that the other parent gets to make to dictate to me when
I can see my own kids.
COURT: Well Mr. Van Hook: Because ultimately, Judge, the proof is in the pudding. The proof
is in how things have turned out.
COURT: That's right. That's right. This is what - I'm just going to suggest to
you on this thing is the struggle on this is whether this is a matter of the manner in
which the order was written or the manner in which the order is being carried out.
If it's a matter in which the order is written, that's one thing - I mean as to how
that thing gets fixed, by modification or by some proceedings or reopen the thing
to clarify or to change the manner in which the order is written. If it's the manner
in which the order is carried out, that's a separate matter. But that's the old matter
of how the thing is to be enforced. Neither one of those things have anything to
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do with whether or not DeMeyer is showing any impartiality or bias. That's my
struggle with this.
Mr. Van Hook: He signed the order in opposition to what he gave. He gave the
order sitting behind the bench, told her to write - told Ms. Stretch to write the
order herself, that I could not have any part in playing to it, to submit that order
directly to the court. And the order she submitted to the court, to Judge DeMeyer,
is not the order that he gave. (T Pg46 L2-25 & Pg47 Ll-7)
The following is from the Transcript from the Motion Hearing on April 21, 2016 (Filed
May 11, 2016) (Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause) See Exhibits File pages 38-45
Miss Stretch: when I say that I have seen unrelenting disrespect for the Court and
for the legal process, I have seen that since the summer of 2014 because I was
part of this. Whether I signed on in July or not, I've been part of this and have
had direct knowledge of all of this. (T. pg.13 Ll-6)
Appellant firmly requests the Court review the audio record and require Ms. Stretch to
demonstrate EXACTLY where this "Unrelenting Disrespect for the Court" is that Ms. Stretch
has claimed was done by Appellant. When Ms. Stretch is unable to demonstrate this, then
Appellant asserts this to be a Fraud on the Court. On another occasion, Ms. Stretch claimed the
Appellant had an 'Outburst' in court, which is why Judge DeMeyer had threatened incarceration
of the appellant. Appellant has denied this before and denies it again, and absolutely insists the
Court Audio Record be reviewed, and Ms. Stretch should be obligated to show exactly where
this 'Outburst' is that she claims to have knowledge of. Judge McKee referenced an 'Affidavit'
being adequate, and that Ms. Stretch could write attesting to this, which sounds a lot like hearsay
to the Appellant, and Hearsay is not fact. Appellant also asserts that this gives the appearance of
the Court attempting to assist Ms. Stretch in covering up a fraud on the court, which would be an
abuse of discretion and erroneous.
THE COURT: Well, the standpoint of an affidavit is probably adequate for her to say on
information and belief because Ms. Grant told her that Ms. Grant was present when there
was an outburst. She goes back and tells Ms. Stretch, and Ms. Stretch puts it in the
affidavit. (T Pg27 L 11-16)
Ms. Stretch continued
Miss Stretch: Concerning writing the decree, of course the Court knows this, and I
assume Mr. Vanhook does not know. Under the new family law rules, any final
decree order, that kind of thing needs to get approval by the other side. Under the
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IRCPs it does not. So in asking you, do you want me to run this by Mr. Vanhook,
it was simply, do you want to follow the rules as written, or do we want to - you
know, we want to go with the family law rules, the case is under the old rules, not
the new ones. I believe the Court chose to go with those. (T. pg.13 L7-18)
Whether it's the 'Old Rules' or the 'New Rules' ... Appellant asserts there is NO RULE
that allows the Court to give an order, allow only one of the parties to write the order and not
have any input from the other party before submitting it to the Court and having it signed and
enforced when it is inconsistent with the Order that was given. No such rule exists, and
Appellant asserts this to be a Fraud on the Court by Ms. Stretch.
Miss Stretch: And whether Mr. Vanhook is aware of it or not - or I guess
he is not - I did object during the trial to having the CPO testimony come in again
and other witnesses that weren't even on the witness list come in. And you
overruled me. And I know that running through my head was, like, oh crap, now
I'm going to have to deal with all this. I wasn't - you know, that I- kind of on
the fly because this was not something that I thought should have come in. But
you overruled me and allowed this stuff to come in.
I don't believe Mr. Vanhook understood that you overruled me. He chose
not to introduce CPO testimony. He chose not to have his girlfriend's daughter
testify about his daughter. There are a number of things that you overruled me on
that he chose not to - not to actually pursue. That's got nothing to do with me.
Nor does that have anything to do with the Court. And it - so it's not a showing
of bias. If anything - I mean, if I wanted to make the argument that - you know,
that you were against me, not that it is, you know, I mean, there was just - he,
obviously does not know certain things not being an attorney. But there's a
number of things I objected to that you overruled me on and he chose not to
follow the opening that you had given him. (T. pg.14 L3-25, pgl5. Ll-4)
From the Audio Record for the Trial in CV-2014-7409 on Aug. 03, 2015. These Oral
Exchanges between Ms. Bond, the Court and Mr. Van Hook are directly inconsistent with Ms.
Bonds Claims. Appellant asserts this to be a demonstration of Frauds on the Court.
Ms. Stretch: Again, Relevance
COURT: Sustained

Mr. Van Hook: Judge at the, in the Protection Order
COURT: I don't care what happened in the Protection Order. This is my case.
I'm trying it, and I'm hearing it. So, I'm sustaining objection.
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Mr. Van Hook: Is there still the testimony that was offered still in this case
though? The previous testimonies that were given.
COURT: It's an all brand new ball game at this point in time.
Mr. Van Hook: I'm failing to understand then why we cannot allow the testimony
of people if it was already offered at the CPU.
COURT: I'm not considering it.

*****
COURT: I think you'd have to call Tiffany Warren. I don't think I can---- as
such without her being here.
Mr. Van Hook: She is here in the hall way sir.
Court: Well, do you want to call her then?
Ms. Stretch: Well we object, she's not on the list.
Court: Oh she's not on the list?
Ms. Stretch: She's not on the July 6th witness list. She's on the July 30th one but
not the July 6th one. So she's on the one you already dismissed.
Mr. Van Hook: Again, these are text messages I just became aware of about a
week ago.
Court: All right I'm going to sustain the objection.
Returning to Transcript from the Motion Hearing on April 21, 2016 (Filed May 11, 2016)
(Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge for Cause) See Exhibits File pages 38-45
Miss Stretch: The simple truth is, If Mr. Vanhook chose to actually take a look in
the mirror and try to make himself a better father, his kids would want to see him.
Again, the fact that his kids don't want to communicate with him has nothing to
do with me, nor does that have anything to do with this Court. He's got- he's got
time to speak to them on the phone, and he can visit them if they want. But they
still - because his behavior has not changed, they have no desire to see him.
Again, nothing to do with me, nor to do with this Court. It's strictly Mr. Vanhook
and his - his parenting skills. (T. pg 15 Ll8-25, pg 16 Ll-5)
This is directly inconsistent with the Written Order. The Appellant has Absolutely No
Parental Rights he can exercise. Appellant again requests the court fully review the Courts Order
on Audio and compare it to the Written Order that the Appellant was not allowed any
participation in writing or any agreement to its correctness before it was signed by the Court and
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then enforced.
After Appellant addressed the Court, Ms. Bond, attorney for Respondent addressed the
Court. Appellant tried to make the Court aware of the inconsistencies with Ms. Bonds
arguments when she finished, but was not allowed to make them. Appellant asserts the
following demonstrates Gary DeMeyers violation of the Appelants right to Due Process, and
furthers what appellant asserts to be the appearance of conspiracy to prevent the truth from being
told.
Mr. Vanhook: I do have rebuttal for some of that, Judge.
The Court: No, I'm not anymore. You've had your time, Mr. Vanhook.
Mr. Vanhook: Some of her stuff was just absolutely false.

The Court: So Mr. Vanhook, I'm going to deny your motion. I find this motion
to be frivolous, without cause, and I'm going to award them their attorneys fees
and costs for having to defend it.
Appellant filed another Appeal with the District Court (hereinafter the '2nd Appeal')
Appellant asserts there were frauds on the Court and Violations of Due Process in the Magistrate
Court, and the Decision in the Magistrate Court was an 'Abuse of Discretion', and that Gary
DeMeyer is absent of all jurisdiction in CV-2014-7409 ..
Further Arguments are made that are supported directly by the Transcript of the Hearing
held on Dec. 8, 2016 and filed Dec. 14, 2016
Gary DeMeyer was obliged to do nothing on this case before hearing and deciding the
Motion to disqualify with cause. Yet Gary DeMeyer did not comply with the requirement of
IRCP Rule 40.
Kimberly Stretch continues to say the phone calls to the children are at the Kids
Discretion, when that was not the order given by the Court at the Decision after the trial. This,
appellant asserts, is a direct misrepresentation of a material fact, and therefore a Fraud on the
Court.
Gary DeMeyer attempted to claim the Motion to Disqualify wasn't noticed for Hearing,
and a review of the record will demonstrate that is untrue.
Gary DeMeyer was directly cited or a defendant in a Motion for Writ of Mandamus, and
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a Civil Complaint for Damages, and therefore a bias existed.
Gary DeMeyer refused to allow timely objections to be made, and did so threatening
Appellant with incarceration.
Ms. Stretch denied having been served with the Appellants Civil Complaint for Damages
where she was cited as a Defendant, which is an absolutely False Statement, as she had been
served prior to this hearing.
Ms. Stretch referred to pending Motions before the District Court as trying to orchestrate
a Bias, and Judge DeMeyer ruled as such.

In the 2nd Appeal to the District Court, In the Respondents Brief, filed with the Court on
Feb. 27, 2017, on page 8, Ms. Stretch states as follows:
" 'Stretch' objected to the four (4) new witnesses on Van Hook's July 30, 2015
Witness List for not being disclosed in a timely manner. The objection was
sustained, and those four (4) persons were to be prohibited from testifying.
However, when Van Hook tried to call one, and Stretch renewed her Objection, it
was overruled, and Van Hook was allowed to call a newly disclosed witness. For
reasons unknown, he did not call that witness, however. Stretch also objected to
the introduction of all evidence from the Adams County CPO hearing as an
attempt to re-litigate the CPO hearing, and was again overreuled. But again for
reasons unknown, Van Hook chose not to question his witnesses about the issues
that arose in the Adams County CPO case."
Appellant asserts that this statement by Ms. Stretch on her Respondents Brief, is a
continuing Fraud On The Court, dealing with the same fraud earlier mentioned, just with a new
phraseology. The witnesses name is Ms. Tiffany Warren. Ms. Warren is the only witness during
the trial that any issue was raised on ... so this will prevent Ms. Stretch from claiming there was
some misunderstanding and that she may have been speaking of some other witness that was
objected to. And Again, the Audio Record for the Trial in CV-2014-7409, very clearly shows in
plain spoken English, that Ms. Tiffany Warren being called as a witness by Appellant was
objected to by the Respondent, and the Court very clearly Sustained the Respondents objection,
and the witness was not allowed. Furthermore; the Audio Record clearly shows that Judge
DeMeyer ruled on the day of the trial, that he would not allow anything from the Adams County
CPO, which had been consolidated with CV-2014-7409, to be admitted in the trial, and
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specifically stated the Court would not consider it. Appellant went into the trial with the rightful
belief that the cases had been consolidated, and therefore did not have any need to call witnesses
that had previously testified. The Court made the decision, while the trial was underway, that
nothing from the Adams County CPO would be considered. Again, the record must be reviewed
as it clearly demonstrates that Ms. Kimberly Stretch is misrepresenting a Material Fact, and
appellant asserts that to be a Blatant Fraud on the Court.
The Fact that the Court, presided over by Gary DeMeyer, refused to allow any testimony
and/or evidence, that had been presented in Adams County CV-2014-3311 which was
consolidated with Canyon County CV-2014-7409, clearly demonstrates the epitome of what is
defined by "Natural Resources. v. U.S., 966 F. 2dl292, 97, (9th Cir.'92). A clear error of
judgment; an action not based upon consideration of relevant factors and so is arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law or if it was taken
without observance of procedure required by law,"; which is not to ever say this is the only
grievance against Gary DeMeyer during the proceedings in question. The grievances Appellant
has against Gary DeMeyer and attorneys (officers of the Court) involved, would take volumes
and volumes to completely demonstrate and argue; and Appellant has no doubt that when both
cases are finally heard together, that any reasonable and prudent person would conclude these
things don't come anywhere close to satisfying then appearance of justice.
On page 9 of the 2nd Appeal to the District Court, In the Respondents Brief, it states,
"Cannon lodged Objections to both motions", which is in reference to the Appellants Motions
for Reconsideration and Retrial that were withdrawn by Ms. Virginia Bond, Counsel for
Appellant at the time, but withdrawn while in the absence of any affidavit by Appellant. These
Objections filed by Respondent are a violation of the doctrine of Estoppel, and Appellant will
clearly demonstrate this beyond doubt, in the Hearing under IRCP Rule 60 that must inevitably
occur, when comparing testimonies and rulings between the Adams County CPO and the Canyon
County trial. (Appellants Brief filed Jan. 30, 2017 (Record pages 1248 - 1265))
The 'Previous Appeal' (the 1st appeal) was cited in the 2nd appeal, in the 'Statement of
Facts', where it was stated, "All facts, issues and/or arguments listed and/or detailed in the
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previous appeal are now cited and made part of this new appeal. In addition to those things in
the previous appeal, new issues are raised in this Appeal and further arguments are made herein."
"Did the Magistrate Court err in failing to identify and redress fraud upon the court
whereby Judge DeMeyer demonstrated bias and/or favoritism toward the Respondent?"
As the District Court of Appeals (in the first appeal) clearly stated the Appellants
complaints were NOT frivolous, and that there was NOT JUSTICE in the case, and that the
Appellant was correct in asserting that his parental rights had been terminated without cause, the
Magistrate Court abused its discretion in denying all motions, and the District Court abused its
discretion in failing to overturn the Magistrate Courts decision.
This abuse of discretion is even further clarified in the fact that Judge McKee, in the first
appeal, directly told the appellant there were remedies under Rule 60, and that appellant needed
to file them in the right order
THE COURT: Had there been a pending motion for a Rule 60, and there was a Motion
to Recuse, now you would have them in the right order, but you don't have them in the right
order here. You have the Motion to Recuse, and there's nothing pending. There's no action
pending. If you had filed the Motion to Reopen or a Motion to Reconsider or the Rule 60(b)
motion because of what you're talking about now, and then filed the Motion to Recuse and had
something to back it up, you have them in the right order, but you don't have it in the right order
here. (T Pg 13 L17-25 Pg 14 L 1-2)
... and the appellant did exactly as Judge McKee stated. Appellant filed for change of
orders under Rule 60, and a Motion for Change of venue (also filed for contempt, but that's
another issue) Then these motions were never heard by Judge Smyser, (what appellant asserts to
be a violation of due process) but were passed on to Judge DeMeyer again ... who then dismissed
everything.
MR. VAN HOOK: May I ask a question, Judge? If I were to file a motion
tomorrow, a Motion to Modify, who is going to hear the case?
THE COURT: Right now?
MR.VAN HOOK: Would it be Judge DeMeyer?
THE COURT: I don't know. Probably.
MR. VAN HOOK: So that shows that he has jurisdiction.
THE COURT: He does.
MR. VAN HOOK: Okay. So that would be at any time.
THE COURT: Well, but then there would also be an active case. And, frankly,
the Motion to Recuse and the motion -- I guess it's got to be without prejudice
because there isn't anything to recuse on. If you file a new motion tomorrow, and
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then file a Motion to Recuse, now you've got something to file -- there's an active
case pending for him to act on. (T Pg 41 L14-25 & Pg 42 Ll-6)
Further support that the District Court of Appeals advised Appellant to file under Rule 60
THE COURT: There are still some rights under 60, but they're on down -- 60(c),
(d), and (e) and whatnot (T Pg. 14 L 17-19)
THE COURT: Well, the standpoint of an affidavit is probably adequate for her to say on
information and belief because Ms. Grant told her that Ms. Grant was present when there was an
outburst. She goes back and tells Ms. Stretch, and Ms. Stretch puts it in the affidavit. (T Pg27 L
11-16)
THE COURT: Absolutely. I have no problem at all understanding that the judge is
going to look at this and say this is wrong. This side of the case is wrong. I have no problem at
all understanding that. (T Pg 30 L5-8)
THE COURT: The impartiality of the judge -- he's not expected to be a robot. The judge
is a human being. He's expected to bring into the decision making process the normal human
reactions that a human being would have to the circumstances in front of him. He evaluates
testimony from the standpoint of the reasonable person. The standpoint of a burden of proof
being a preponderance of the evidence requires subjective evaluation, not as a robot, not as a
computer, but as a human being. (T Pg 36 L5-14)
THE COURT: And I understand based upon what you've told me that there may be some
basis for being upset. If they screwed up this order, and it was supposed to order that your
children not have anything to do with these Eldridge folks, and that should have been in the
order, and it wasn't. (T Pg43 Ll 7-22)
Respondents Brief appears to be missing from the record that was sent to the Supreme
Court after Appellant had objected to the first record that was to be sent up. It was on the
original batch of documents on pages 904 - 937, so there was no need to object to it being
missing ... but for some reason it now appears to be missing from the record.
Appellants Response filed Mar. 30, 2017 (Record Pages 1269-1273)
Memorandum Decision On Appeal (Record pages 1274 - 1280)
In the appeal, after all briefs were filed, Appellant requested Oral Arguments, and the
District Court in its discretion decided not to hear oral arguments.
On page 4 of the Memorandum Decision on Appeal (Record page 1277) Judge McKee
states, "the separate lawsuit appears to be nothing more than a rehash of Van Hook's complaints
against the judge in this case that have all been aired and ruled upon before." The Respondent
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must demonstrate EXACTLY where these have been ruled on. The fact is, they have not been
ruled on, nor have they even been heard by any court. Every single thing filed by Appellant gets
dismissed without considering anything in the motions or actions. (which gives the appearance
of more than one judge in the 3rd judicial district assisting in preventing justice.) The claim that
all these complaints have been heard before and dismissed was also something the Respondent
claimed this in her brief, which is a fraud on the court, and the Appeals Court mirrored her claim
without verifying any of this, which is an abuse of discretion and erroneous. (referring back to
the Transcript section already quoted, Judge McKee, on more than one occasion in the 1st
Appeal Hearing, made it clear the Appellants issues with the Court and certain Officers of the
Court were legitimate. It seems apparent that Judge McKee changed his position somewhere
between the time he ruled on the first appeal and the time the Appellant filed the 2nd appeal.
The basic overview of the time frame on these things (Memorandum Decision on Appeal filed
Oct. 18, 2017, New Motions were filed in the Magistrate Court on Oct. 20, 2017, Order denying
Motions was filed on Dec 14, 2016, New Notice of Appeal filed Dec. 16, 2017) Appellant didn't
waste much time at all in filing the new motions after the 1st appeal was unsuccessful. The
filings were as advised by the Appellant Court in the 1st appeal, After the Motions were all
dismissed by Gary DeMeyer, Appellant again didn't waste time in filing the appeal to the
District Court again. It seems very inappropriate and appears to be an abuse of discretion for
Judge McKee to advise Appellant on how to proceed, for appellant to proceed as advised, for
those motions to be thrown out, for appellant to file a new appeal, and for Judge McKee to
dismiss the appeal and state all the issues have already been ruled on when that is nowhere near
. being true. Appellant asserts Judge McKee is in error and has abused his discretion.
On page 5 of the Memorandum Decision on Appeal (Record page 1278) Judge McKee
states, "There has been no evidence presented that Judge DeMeyer is either a party to or has any
personal interest in the outcome of this case." Appellant argues that all the actions of Judge
DeMeyer must be reviewed, and should the Supreme Court conclude as Appellant asserts, that
Gary DeMeyer has on numerous occasions deliberately violated Due Process, Equal Protection,
and/or other civil rights of the Appellant, then there would be 'Personal Interest' in the Case by
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Judge DeMeyer.
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his
constitutional rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no
longer as a judge, but as a "minister" of his own prejudices. [386 U.S. 547,568].
Conclusion on page 6 of the of the Memorandum Decision on Appeal (Record page
1279)
"Since the remaining issues were neither argued nor supported by authority, they
are waived and therefore dismissed".
Other issues are clearly argued and supported by authority _on the Appellants Brief pages
7-9 (Record pages 1258-1260)

In the Appellants Brief it is argued that Appellants Motion for Change of and/or New
Orders was filed under Rule 60 (b) and had no time restraint under (4), (5), or (6), and that
Appellant clearly stated Changes in Circumstance in the actual Motion and Affidavit. This issue
was clearly argued and supported by authority, and the District Court is in Error for concluding
this issue was never argued or supported by authority.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Title Vill Rule 60 (b) (6) are Grounds for Relief from a
Final Judgment for any other reason that justifies relief, has no time limitations or restrictions per
IRCP Title Vill 60 (c) (1). As such, the Supreme Court should hear the grievances of the
Appellant, review the record and conclude that the Appellant clearly has legitimate grievances
that concern misconduct and/or frauds committed by the Respondent and Officers of the Court in
CV-2014-7409 in Canyon County, and CV-2014-3311 in Adams County.
When a judge acts intentionally and knowingly to deprive a person of his constitutional
rights he exercises no discretion or individual judgment; he acts no longer as a judge, but as a
"minister" of his own prejudices. [386 U.S. 547, 568]. U.S. Supreme Court Reports, PIERSON
v. RAY, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) 386 U.S. 547 PIERSON ET AL v. RAY ET AL. This case law
applies and was argued. It applies to every single motion that the Magistrate Court dismissed,
and was not properly considered, and the District Court is in error for failing to consider this.
"The claim and exercise of a Constitutional right cannot be converted into a
crime" ... "a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law". Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). This case law applies and was argued. It
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applies to every single motion that the Magistrate Court dismissed, and was not
properly considered, and the District Court is in error for failing to consider this ..
Conclusion
This case is absolutely full of Due Process Violations, Equal Protections Violations,
Frauds on the Court, Judicial Misconduct, Attorney Misconduct, multiple inconsistencies in
testimonies, and ultimately what has led to a Termination of the Appellants Parental Rights with
absolutely nothing to support the reasoning for this. Ms. Stretch has argued on several occasions
that Mr. Van Hook is trying to relitigate the issues, however, something cannot be RElitigated
when it was never lawfully litigated in the first place.
This began with Judge Meienhoffer issuing a CPO to Ms. Cannon and awarding her
custody of the children in Adams County after it had already been decided in Canyon County
giving Appellant full custody of the children. After this, Steven Fisher, Counsel for the
Appellant at the time, completely failed in his responsibilities to his client, and on several
occasions completely failed to offer any objection to the Respondents Motions (before the trial)
allowing the Motions to go through unchecked. This is what appellant calls "Stacking the
Deck".
Appellant attempted several motions (pre trial after Mr. Fisher took leave) all of which
were denied without reasonable consideration or without compliance with Due Process, among
other things.
The trial was conducted without compliance with due process, with favoritism towards
the respondent, while refusing to allow testimony, ignoring evidence, elimination of a
consolidated case, destruction of evidence and then ultimately a decision that was not consistent
with the evidence and testimony, while adding things that were never testified to, an order
written solely by the Respondents Counsel as ordered by the Court, that was inconsistent with
the Order actually given by the Court.
Appellant obtained legal counsel (Virginia Bond) for the purpose of appealing the case,
which turned into Motions for reconsideration and a retrial. These motions were dismissed
without the approval of the Appellant, followed by counsel taking leave from the case.
Appellant filed motions again, Pro Se, without the aid of legal counsel, but those motions had
34

been submitted in clear enough fashion that the Court should have considered them. There is
absolutely nothing in this case that comes anywhere close to sounding like justice, and now the
Supreme Court must determine that there are more than reasonable grounds for appellant to insist
upon a Motion under Rule 60 (b) (6) of the IRCP, which should be followed by an Order under
IRCP Rule 60 (d) (3) dismissing all of CV 2014-7409 post Default Judgment. The Supreme
Court must also, for the sake of Justice, order an immediate investigation into the conduct of the
Judges and Attorneys involved and all other persons who played a direct role in anything to do
with this case and the creating and enforcement of an illegal order.

Questions of Law to the Supreme Court:
Are the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct actual Laws that Attorneys in the State of
Idaho are compelled to abide by?
Is the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct a set of Laws that Judges in the State of Idaho are
compelled to abide by?
Does a 'Contract in Fact' exist between a litigant and their retained Attorney that requires
the Attorney to comply with the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct?
What is the distinction between a 'Harmless Error' (per IRCP Rule 61), and an error that
is Not Harmless? And who gets to decide what is or isn't harmless?
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